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Abstract 
The principl巴Sof induction and reduction in th巴philosophicalmeaning are studied to give some important 
devic巴sfor the objectivist foundations of mathematics. Some redundances of assumption are taken up to 
promote estimation sch巴mes. Finally， some relative events are discussed with a special view to th巴
methodological dualism 
o Introduction 
If we simply denote by E(ρ) the assembly of events which fulfil a property 
ρ， itmay not be other than a mere abstract designation. However， ifthere 
factually is found a certain event e fulfilling ρ， then we may certainly have 
eεE(ρ) (0.1) 
and may be convinced that 
E(ρ)ヰとめ.
In this case e isconsidered as an evidence for the fact (0.1)， and E(ρ) as the 
extension of 1叶 Thisprocedure of conception will generally underlie 
mathematical analyses. If E(ρ) is proved to make a determinate set， itis 
called the range of ρ. 
Now we take up the procedure of ‘induction'， which may be defined as 
follows By induction is meant argument from the particular to the more 
general concept.l) According to this definition， the above-mentioned argu-
ment may be considered as an induction from 1 ef to E(戸). The only problem 
in here is to examine if E(p) may be considered as a determinate set. 
If an assembly L(p) is put to be such that only and al the events of L(P) 
are capable of being examined on whether ρis fulfilled by them or not， and if 
L(p) is a (determinate) set， then L(ρ) is called the level ofρand ρis said to be 
levelized by L(β). If L(ρ) and E(ρ) are both determinate， and if every ele 
ment of L(ρ)-E(ρ) does not fulfil ρ， then ρis called an objectivistρroperty. If 
no fear of confusion， by ‘a property' we mean an objectivist one. 
If E(c) is the total aggregate of events which are to be caused by a certain 
cause c， then E (c) i s also called the range of c on condi tion tha t E (c) i s 
determinate. Induction and levelization too， are analogously argued about c to 
the case of a property. If an event e isconsidered to be caused by either one 
of n causes C1， C2， ・・，cn， and if on examination we find that 
本 紀関谷芳雄
(163) 
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eεE(Cl)ハ…..・..パE(cm) 
eをE(Cm+l)U'"・H ・"UE(Cn)，
Cm+1V・・・・・・・・・・・・VCn
(0.2) 
is said to make a redundantρart of causality for e. The argument which 
concludes the part 
C1V・・・・・・・・・VCm
to be sufficient to cause the eve口te instead of 
C1V・・・・・・・・・ VCn，
is considered as a reduction， 
In logical calculus， ifthe clauses ‘Pabc' and ‘-Pxyz. ^. p_μz' where ρ1S a 
predicate and x， y， z are unknown while a， b， c are constants， are gi ven as 
premises， then i t isconcluded that -Pbac. Such a procedure may also be 
considered as a reduction. 
1 Maximization 
Gi ven a property Jうconcerniga set， ifa set E is found to fulfil p， E is an 
evidence for p， and thus， ifwe denote by E(ρ) the class of sets which fulfil 戸，
we apparently have 
EE E(ρ) 
and then we may be convinced that 
E(ρ)ヰct.
When a set E fulfils the propertyρ， we write 
Ecρ， 
(1.1) 
which means the same thing with the relation (1.1). 1f for any two sets A， B 
(in a certain universe) we klways have 
A亡 B.&.BCρ 争.ACρ，
then βis a fegfessz-ueρroperty (of a set). Suppose that the propertyρis re-
gressive and that there is a family of sets M which satisfies the following 
condi tions : 
( i) MCE(ρ) ; 
(i) A，BεM&.AヰB:今 :AcB.V.Bζ A; 
(ii) U(ρ)=UAEMA.&. U(ρ)亡K.&.U(ρ)*K:今 .Kc仁ρ.
Such a family M is called an incrωse completion in respect ofρ， and if U(β) 
can be considered to be determinate as the sum2) of M， thenρis said to be 
maxirnizable in resped ofρ 
Now， following fads are provable : 
(1) a regressi ve propertyρis not always maximizable ; 
(I) even ifρis maximizable， we do not always have 
U(ρ)こρ.
(164) 
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(I) may be verified by the following counterexample. Let us define a property 
ρsuch that for any subset A of the closed interval CO，lJ 
Acρ.=.1花A ニ O~)
Then， ifAo= {O， 1} we certainly have Ao cρ， and we easily see that p is 
regressive. Now suppose thatρis maximizable and M is an increase com-
pletion in respect ofρ. Then i t m ustbe that 
備U(ρ)ヰ0， (1.2) 
because : ifm U(戸)=0，then CO，lJ -U(ρ)ヰ φsothat we may take out a point 
βE CO，lJ -U(β) and define U1 by 
U1二 U(p)U {β} 
for which we apparently have 
rnU1=0. 
Hence we see here the condition (ii) is not satisfied. On the other hand， for 
any increasing sequence of sets (A k)(んこ1，2，.一)taken from the family M， we 
have 
rnAk=O， 
hence rn( U Ak) = o.
Thus， in the light of (1.2)， we see that M cannot be a summable family2l， so that 
U(p) cannot be the sum of M. Consequently，ρcannot be maximizable. 
A counterexample verifying (I) will be shown at the end of the next sec-
tlOn. 
2 Probabilist Unionization 
If there is promised the one and only one ticket to be found as the winning 
one among n tickets， and if the probability of winning is stipulated as to be 
uniformly equal for every ticket to the same value Pn， then we have 
ρn=J(21) 
hence limρn=O. (2.2) 
However， ifwe leave the stipulation (2.1) unapplied and directly watch the 
factual condition， itmust utterly be essential that there exists the only one 
winning ticket. So， let this one be the kth ticket. Then， the other tickets 
which are not kth， must make up together the redundant part for the proba 
bility of winning. Thus the situation must be such that 
ρn(k)ニ l
and Pn(j) = 0 (j宇k)
where ρn(j) means the real probability of winning for the jth ticket (j= 1，…， n). 
There has been an argument that， in the light of the evaluation (2.2)， we 
may assert that no ticket would win in the limitless case ; which has been called 
*) m means the a priori measure which is a generalized extension of Lebesgue measure 
(165) 
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the lotteryρaradox. However， we may say that the stipulation (2.1) should not 
be so sophistically (or psychologically) treated as such. On such a procedure as 
(2.1)， the probability for a single individual willlose its significance but that it 
is related to the others in a unionized way. In effect， since by (2.1) we always 
have 
nρn二 1，
the relation 
lim nρn=l 
should also be maintained. So， we may assert that the total possibility of 
winning is always equal to 1. Hence it must be denied that no ticket would 
WlD. 
Some similar situation to the above-mentioned is observed in the negation 
of total additivity of a homogeneous probability measure. If for any two sets A 
and B of real numbers we have 
Pr(XεA):Pγ(XεB)=JnA:街B
on condition that both仇Aand 仇Bare finite， then the aleatory variable X is 
homogeneous and Pγ(XεA) is a homogeneous probability measure. In this 
case， denoting as 1=(一∞，∞)andん lxI k-1 ~ x <k}， we may easily see 
that 
Pr(Xεh)ニo for al k二 1，2，・，
so that 
2.}Pγ(XεIk)= 0ヰ 1=Pr(Xε1). 
Thus， i t has been asserted that the measure P r(XεA) cannot be totally 
additive. 
On this problem， parallel to the recognition that 
Pr(Xι1)=1， 
we must attach importance to the fact that the total accumulation of the events 
Xεム(k二 1，2，…)
must make an equivalence to the probability of the event 
XEよ
So then， we sould in aロyway interpolate the relation 
I=Ulk 
in the argument. In this context the summands 
pr(XζIk) (k=1，2，…) 
(2.3) 
should be considered as infinitesimal quantities to make up the total value 1 in 
connection with (2.3). Hence， let us represent this constitution as 
Pγ(Xε1)二 (u)2.}Pγ(XεIk)
and cali the right side a unionizedmmmhion-TheH，we WIll naturally have 
the following relations to be asserted : 
(i)(u)ER(Xdh)二 Oand (u)ER(XεIk)= 1 (η 二 1，2， ..); 
(166) 
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白i) (u)ZP7(Xεω二干 (ν二以 )， etc 
In the above case， ifwe define a propertyρsuch that 
Acρ.三 .Pr(XεA)ニ 0，
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then ρis regressive. Then， itcan easily proved that戸ismaximizable but 
U(ρ)江ρ;which verifies the fact (I) shown in Sect. 1. 
3 Redundance in Estimation 
In case of the lottery problem， ifevery real number is a ticket index， and if 
the ticket indexed by αis the one and only one winning ticket， then we have 
ρα二 1，ρx=O(x宇α)， 
ρx being the probabili ty of winning of the ticket indexed by x. So， the tickets 
not indexed by αwill factually make up the redundant part of this lottery. 
Such a redundance is called an intrinsic redundance. 
Conversely， when we do not know there is the one and only one winning 
ticket， no other way than the homogeneous estimation is allowed， that is， we 
can expect no other values than the same one for everyρx. Thus， Jうxmust 
necessarily be an infinitesimal quantity. So， ifwe write it as 
ρxニ θρ，
the constitution of our estimation may be realized by introduction of the uni-
onized integration 
( u)にρ=1
which may be defined analogously to the concept of the unionized summation. 
In this context， the intrinsic redundance disappears， but we may say that there 
instead is an implicit redundance observed everywhere homogeneous. 
In case of an estimation of some experimental trials， we may draw upon 
another sort of redundance which grows up practically. For instance， in the 
case of urn-sampling， ifit is unquestionable that the urn contains exactly two 
balls which are ei ther whi te or black， then the following three cases are possi 
ble : (1) w， W ; (2) w， b ; (3)b， b (w meaning a whi te ball and b a black one) 
Suppose that we gain a sample by two times of drawing with replacement 
Then the sample will justly be either of the patter日s(1)， (2)， and (3). If the 
sample is (1)， then the urn is possibly estimated to be either (1) or (2)， so that the 
case (3) makes the redundant part ; ifthe sample is (3)， (2) and (3) are possi ble 
and (1) is redundant ; and finally， ifthe sample is (2)， the content of the urn is 
exactly known to be (2) itself. Each redundance above-mentioned may be 
considered as a sort of informational redundance reduced by sampling. 
Incidentally， redundance may be considered as an essential source of 
theoretical日oise. When an assumed object is not yet ascertined to be really 
existent， itmay at most give a theoretical noise， and if it is in fact inexistent it 
(167) 
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must be a redundance to the conception. 
When we want to conjecture the cause of an event e， ifit is unquestionable 
that the cause is to be found among m causes C1， C2， ・・，Cm， we may refer to the 
following formula due to T. Bayes : 
P(Ck)P(e，Ck) 
P(Ck，e)二 m
"5.}，P(cJP(e，cJ 
where P(Ck， e) is the probability that e is caused by Ck， P(e， Ck) the probability 
that C.k causes e， and P(Ck) is the a priori probability by which Ck is to be 
expected to occur. However， itis usually noted that the assignment of values 
for P(Ck) (k= 1， 2，…， m) may scarcely be decided wi th assurance. Then， the 
authenticity of the formula is considered to be very faint. Thus being the 
condition， itmay be proposed that the principle of reduction suggested by (0.2) 
is preferable as a sounder one. 
4. Methodological Dualism 
In actual mathematical inqumes， there has existed a curious methodo-
logical dualism which is distinguished by the opposition between heuristic 
precept and examinative principles31; which may be restated in a practical 
sketch as follows : for an inquiry， to detect a solution is essentially a different 
thing from having a demonstrati ve way to reach a solution. Such a gap be 
tween solutions and the demonstrative procedures to obtain them should be 
eliminated somehow. For this purpose， itseems firstly requisite to study into 
the total aggregate of solutions of the gi ven inquiry. 
Given a special propertyρ， ifat least one event e isfound fulfilling it， 1 ef
may possi bly be extended to the locus ofρ 
E(ρ)ェ{α|αcρ}. 
If E(戸)is determinate， then it may certainly be considered as the range ofρ. 
However， ifE(β) is not allowed to be so，ρi tself cannot be considered as an 
objecti vist property. Thus being the condi tion， a simply assumed range E(p) 
is essentially no more than a mere object abstracted in the annexed set theory41. 
So， in this situation， we may see a dualism between the given property p and 
its objectivistness which is to be inspected by the examination of E(ρ) ; which 
may eventually be taken as a dualism between ρand E(ρ). 
In the theory of operations (or mappings)， we have a dualism more complex. 
Given an operation /， firstly assume that there exists at least one pair of events 
αand βsuch that 
βニf(α). 
Then we may possibly suppose a (determinate) set A such that 
(V'αεA)(f(α) exists)， 
(168) 
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which is called a domain of f ifthe aggregate 
f(A)={β|β=f(α) ，αεA} 
is also a set. In this case f(A) is certainly the range of f on the domain A. 
Such being the condition， we see that the problem whether a given set A may 
be thought as a domain of f simultaneously draws upon the problem whether a 
set B may determinately exist as a range of f， that is B= f(A). So then we 
may see a dualism between A and f(A). 
The way starting from the set 
f( {α})= {β|β二 f(α)}
to obtain its extension 
f(A)={yl y= f(x )，xεA}， 
necessitates not only the existence of y's but also the existence of a (de 
terminate) universal set Y such that 
(ヨx)(y=f(x))二争.yE Y. (4.1) 
Then， by taking the dualism， we may moreover have a uni versal set X to be 
日ecessarysuch that 
(ヨグ )(X=f-l(y))~.X ε x. (4.2) 
So， we may say that y is bred by f through the condition (4.1)， and inversely x 
is bred by f← 1 through the condition (4.2). 
If there i s anαsuch thatβ=f(α)EEY， then βmust be but a fictitious object 
fabricated against α. If we， notwithstanding the criticism， require the exis 
tence of such aβ， itmust be that we create a new element by βOf course， 
such aβmay not be expected to fit in with the proto-construction5)(or the 
present system of construction). Thus， on addition of the new element the 
proto-construction will be revised and extented to a new system which may 
comprehend βwell together with the previous elements. After duch a re 
vision， the universe X too may possibly be changed. If it is to be such that 
Xニ Y，then the same new elements must be adjoined to both X and Y. A 
good example of such a case is given by the adjunction of /三~ to the real 
numbers. 
If the set f(A) cannot exactly be determined though i tsexi stence cannot 
be denied， then f(A) will possibly be considered as an undecidable object. 
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